The Perfect Storm: The Role of Public Health and Ethnic Composition in Refugees-related Conflict Initiation[1]

Tracy Kuo Lin
Aaron P. Shreve

Abstract

Why do some refugee influxes increase the likelihood of refugee-receiving states to initiate interstate while others do not? Existing studies find a strong relationship between refugees and interstate conflict. However, the specific conditions connecting refugees and interstate conflict initiation remain underexplored. We suggest that refugees alone do not generate sufficient burden to push refugee-receiving states to initiate interstate conflict. Refugees are associated with an increased probability for conflict initiation only when refugee-receiving states face certain preexisting domestic conditions, particularly public health burdens and high ethnic homogeneity, that allow for the securitization of refugees. In addition to finding patterns consistent with current literature on refugees, civil and international conflict, we find that when refugees are present in states with low levels of preventive health care there is a higher likelihood conflict initiation. We also find evidence that suggests when refugee-receiving states have high ethnic homogeneity, it leads to a higher propensity for conflict initiation.

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1. Introduction

In early 2013, the Jordanian government announced that it would send its special forces into Syria, which is plagued by civil violence, to secure safe havens for Syrians fleeing the conflict.[2] After accepting over 200,000 Syrian refugees, the Jordanian Prime Minister, Abdolluh Ensour, announced that Syrian refugees were no longer welcome in Jordan. Instead of allowing additional displaced Syrians to enter, the Jordanian government sent its military across the border into Syria to protect Syrians affected by the violence. Why would Jordan put its own military in danger by sending Jordanian troops into a country experiencing a civil war just to protect foreign nationals? More interestingly, even before this announcement by Prime Minister Ensour, when Jordan was still accepting Syrian refugees, human rights groups reported that Jordanian officials specifically were refusing entry to Syrians of Palestinian origin.[3] Why would Jordan accept certain refugees while denying entry to others of particular ethnic origins? What is it about the Syrian refugees and the threat of additional refugees that affected Jordanian policy decisions?

The Rwandan Genocide provides a less recent, but still relevant example. One of the major international consequences of the Rwandan Genocide was the Great Lakes refugee crisis, which began in April 1994 and resulted the exodus of an estimated two million Rwandan refugees into three neighboring states: Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania (Cutts et al. 2000). Recent studies suggest that migrations of such magnitude lead to a increased propensity for civil (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006) and interstate (Salehyan 2008) conflict. Looking at the conditions in the three refugee-receiving states, the refugees led to conflict between Zaire and Rwanda, an escalation in the civil conflict in Burundi, and no major conflicts in Tanzania.

What explains the varying effects of refugee influxes in these states? Why do some refugee influxes lead to conflict while others do not? These two refugee crises highlight the questions that surround the relationship between refugees and conflict. While many studies find that refugee influxes are associated with increased propensity for conflicts (Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008; Johnson 2011; Lischer 2005; Salehyan 2008; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006) most refugee influxes are not connected to conflicts (Lischer 2001, Mogire 2011). It is thus important to examine the underlying conditions connecting refugees and interstate conflict.

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[2] Kareem Fahim, "Jordan Says it Won't Accept Massive Influx of Syrian Refugees.," *New York Times*, January 17, 2013. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/world/middleeast/syria-war-developments.html?ref=global-home&_r=0. Accessed January 18, 2013.

[3] Ibid.

We suggest that refugees are associated with increased propensity for conflict when refugee influxes accompany certain pre-existing socio-economic conditions that allow for the securitization of refugees in the refugee-receiving state. Refugees as negative externalities by themselves may not be severe enough to lead the refugee-receiving state to initiate international conflict. Only when receiving states already face particular socio-economic conditions can the additional negative externalities of refugees push states to initiate interstate conflict. This paper focuses on four intervening conditions in the refugee-receiving state that may increase in the probability of conflict initiation when are present: health, ethnic, political, and economic conditions. First, refugees cause further strain in states with already poor public health or refugees can worsen the receiving state's public health. Second, receiving states with high ethnic homogeneity are particularly susceptible to the possible negative externalities brought by refugees. Third, refugees can exacerbate ongoing civil conflicts or lead to the outset of new civil conflicts. Finally, the economic costs of providing for refugees can further damage the poor economy of a receiving state.

This study demonstrates that the public health conditions and ethnic composition of a refugee-receiving state are important factors that interact with refugee influxes to increase the propensity for interstate conflict initiation. States with lower public health level and states that are more ethnically homogeneous are more likely to securitize refugees and engage in militarized actions internationally. Furthermore, contrary to general expectations, at the macro-level, economic shocks and intrastate conflicts do not interact with refugee influxes to exacerbate aggressive behaviors from states.

The contribution of these findings is twofold. First, by examining specific conditions outside of the general conception of state capacity, this study presents a more nuanced view of the refugee-conflict connection. Second, this study pays special attention to two intervening conditions which affect the capacity of states, but have not received the attention they deserve in the refugee-conflict literature: the relationship between inter-group relations and ethnicity and the impact of domestic public health conditions. The findings on public health and ethnicity in the refugee-conflict context in turn emphasize the importance of non-traditional factors in international security studies (Buzan and Hanson 2009).

In order to support our line of reasoning, we first review previous findings on the relationship between refugees and conflict initiation. We highlight the discussion of the specific

conditions that affect the relationship between refugees and conflict and put forth our theoretical framework. The combination of refugees and suboptimal socio-economic conditions in refugee-receiving states leads to the host governments to securitize refugees and to use existing military resources to resolve social issues that these governments do not have the resources to cope with directly. Third, we discuss our research design using binary probit models with interaction terms to understand the relationship between refugees and interstate conflict. Finally, we conclude that refugees alone are not sufficient to increase a receiving state's propensity for interstate conflict; the characteristics and existing burden of refugee-receiving states are crucial components connecting refugees to interstate conflict.

2. Refugees and Interstate Conflict

Various studies examine the determinants of refugees and highlight conflict as a major cause (Iqbal 2007; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1986). However, not only can conflict lead to migration flows and produce refugees,[4] but refugees can also serve as a catalyst for conflict. Scholars such as Adamson (2005; 2006) and Weiner (1992-1993) argue that population movement can threaten national security. Domestically, refugees can lead to instability within refugee-receiving states, leading to a higher likelihood for civil conflict (Mogire 2011, Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Furthermore, refugee-receiving states with low capability and low willingness to prevent violence exacerbate the spread of civil conflicts across borders (Lischer 2005).

By quantitatively exploring the relationship between refugees and international tension, Salehyan (2008) finds that refugees increase the likelihood of interstate conflict initiation. Salehyan reasons that issues with refugees can stem from negative externalities, such as economic burden, negative public health consequences, ethnic tensions, and mobilization of "refugee warriors."[5] In many cases, refugee-receiving states are too weak to enforce their borders and restrict refugees, or too weak to demand that other nations implement rules to regulate their

[4] A refugee is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." (Article 1, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951).

[5] Refugee warriors are refugees that are mobilize to act as mercenaries to carry out criminal and violent activities.

migration flows and to relieve the burden created by refugees. These refugee-receiving states' positions in the international arena generally do not allow them the bargaining power necessary to engage in bilateral agreements to control refugee influx; therefore, they resort to the last option of initiating conflict. Salehyan concludes that both refugee-sending states and refugee-receiving states are more likely to initiate militarized disputes. However, while there is a statistically significant relationship between refugees and conflict initiation, there is still a lack of understanding as to the specific conditions explaining variation in this relationship. Under what specific conditions do refugees lead to interstate conflicts?

2.1 Conditions for Conflicts

We agree with Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) and Salehyan (2008) that refugees may act as negative externalities for refugee-receiving countries;[6] however, we suggest that the negative externalities of refugees solely are not sufficient explanations for the increased propensity for international conflict associated with refugees. Given the presence of refugees, there are certain state characteristics that increase the likelihood of international conflict between the refugee-receiving and refugee-sending states. This paper examines four characteristics suggested in previous literature: domestic public health conditions, ethnic conditions, economic conditions, and political stability. In some cases, the presence of these characteristics exists separately from the influx of refugees. In other cases, refugees can exacerbate existing socio-economic issues.[7]

We contend that the interaction of refugees, as negative externalities, and certain socio-economic conditions of a refugee-receiving state leads to harmful consequences for the refugee-receiving state. As a result, the refugee-receiving state may securitize refugees and initiate militarized disputes or conflicts to achieve four potential goals. Securitization of refugees is defined as the characterization and acceptance of refugees as a security threat (Mogire 2011). Securitization includes two core elements: 1) designation of a threat that requires emergency

[6] Salehyan (2008) reasons that the term, "internal negative consequences", suggests that negative consequences are contained within nations and not affecting other nations. However, it is more accurate to perceive states as interconnected and significantly influencing states within the same social network. Therefore, this paper, employs the term "negative externalities" to describe the burden and threats nations face.

[7] An argument could be made that there are certain characteristics of the refugee-sending country that also increase the likelihood of international conflict between the refugees-receiving and refugee-sending states. However, we leave that line of reasoning for future research and only concentrate of the characteristics of the refugee receiving country.

actions or 2) special measures and the acceptance of that designation by an audience (Buzan et al. 1998). Once refugees are securitized, it is then necessary for states to take actions to protect their citizens from refugees. Our outcome of interest is international conflict behavior, which is conceptualized broadly as a set of interactions among states that involve the threat of use of military force, the display of military force, and the actual use of military force. These actions are "explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned" (Gochman and Maoz 1984, 587). The first goal for the refugee-receiving state in initiating conflict is to challenge the refugee-sending state in order to prevent further refugee influx. Second, refugee-receiving states may initiate conflict to manage and keep potential refugees in their state of origin directly. The direct management of potential refugees is seen in the Jordanian intervention to safeguard displaced individuals in Syria in 2013. Third, refugee-receiving states may initiate conflict against other states to extract resources they need or want (Blainey 1988). Fourth, refugee-receiving states may initiate a diversionary conflict to distract the public from suboptimal socio-economic conditions (Blainey 1988).[8]

Refugee-receiving states are willing to incur the costs of accepting refugees up to a point. However, the refugee-receiving state may initiate conflict when the interaction of refugees and domestic conditions produce overwhelming costs, in the form of negative externalities. States will likely engage in bargaining processes, attempting to use progressively more aggressive actions like diplomatic and economic sanctions and closing and militarizing the border, before choosing to use military force (e.g. Palmer and Morgan 2006). In addition, the states will likely include refugees as a part of the bargaining process. States will go to war only if they cannot commit to a negotiated settlement (Fearon 1998). Unfortunately, it often may be difficult for states to come to an agreement to deal with refugees, considering the causes of migrations are most likely out of the control of refugee-receiving states. Therefore, there is a high likelihood for bargaining over refugee influxes to escalate into interstate conflict.

If a state lacks the capabilities to cope with refugees and resolve socio-economic issues, how does it have the capabilities to engage in conflict? The reason for this discrepancy lies behind the sustainability of refugee policies. Taking care of refugees, at the very least, requires governmental resources for processing and a continuous supply of basic necessities to the

[8] In our data, when breaking down the type of military actions, 45% of the interstate conflicts, i.e. MIDs, involve the use of force and only 6% of the conflicts involve only threat, without the mobilization of the military. This provides support for the theory that states' goals are to maximize material interest when engaging in conflicts.

refugees until they can integrate into the society and seek work. The process of supporting and settling refugees generally takes years and a substantial amount of fungible resources and is not always successful.[9] Some nations may be able to initially cope with refugees. However, as these nations realize that the refugee situation within their borders is unsustainable they will act to resolve the issue immediately, which generally requires international action. By initiating conflict, employing military resources that are already present and ready to deploy, a government could potentially terminate the burden of refugees immediately by forcing other countries to cope with the situation. As a result, refugee-receiving states that already face significant socio-economic burdens choose to employ readily available military resources to prevent further influx of refugees. Following our framework for understanding the relationship between refugees and conflict, we divide our discussion on our specific explanation for each condition into four sections, placing special emphases on the lesser-explored conditions: the domestic health conditions and ethnic composition.

3. Refugees and Public Health

We suggest that refugees do not need to significantly affect public health in a refugee-receiving state for the state to initiate interstate conflict. The refugee-receiving state could be facing public health issues prior to the refugee influx. However, after the arrival of the refugees, the additional negative externalities push the refugee-receiving state to securitize refuges and take action to cope with internal crises. These prior conditions include the lack of medical supplies, medical personal, and medical facilities for hosting and quarantining those infected by diseases. Facing refugees who require what the refugee-receiving states already lack, these states have reasons to employ existing military capabilities to preempt further refugees and associated externalities.

While the interaction of refugees and public health level can lead to a higher likelihood of conflict initiation, the link between refugees and conflict also can be due to public health consequences as an intervening variable. That is, refugees deteriorate public health conditions, which then may lead to conflict initiation. Many studies in the public health literature discuss the effects migration can have on the public health levels in migrant-receiving states (Gushulak and

[9] Fungible resources can be easily redirected into other areas, making it less appealing for governments and citizens to spend fungible resources on refugees.

MacPherson 2006; MacPherson, Gushulak, and Macdonald 2007). In the political science literature, Iqbal (2010) finds that in general refugee-receiving states are more likely to experience poorer health outcomes. Refugees are an especially vulnerable group of migrants who are often exposed to significant health risks when they travel (Gushulak and MacPherson 2006). Because of displacement, exposure to harsh and violent conditions that inflict injuries, and lack of adequate necessities, refugees are likely to arrive in host nations with diseases (Toole, Galson, and Brady 1993). In addition, refugees often suffer from limited access to health services (Cutts et al. 2000). As a result, their impact on the refugee-receiving states may be more acute than the impact of general migrants on their host states.[10]

In situations where refugees are not exposed to diseases prior to their arrival to refugee camps, the conditions in refugee camps can generate diseases as well. Most refugee camps lack adequate necessities such as clean water and health care (Toole and Waldman 1997). Furthermore, most refugee camps lack the necessary security to protect those who are more vulnerable, such as women and children, to disease. Women and children are even more likely to experience marginalization in situations where there is no sufficient official authority enforcing law and order (Toole and Waldman 1997). Women and children often are exploited in refugee camps, whether through sexual violence or deprivation of scarce resources (Davies 2010). For these reasons, diseases can quickly become rampant in refugee camps where individuals are confined to a limited area with high population density.

The situation is exacerbated when refugees integrate into the society of receiving states, further spreading diseases into other regions. This is evident in the spread of AIDS in Africa that is greatly associated with refugee movements (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2004, 2004; Reid 1998). Moreover, MacPherson et al. (2006) find that a large number of pediatric HIV infections are children borne to emigrant mothers. The authors argue that imported infection through migration may be an emerging epidemic in states that currently have low HIV incidence. An increase in refugees in a state can have a severe impact on public health conditions in the state.

[10] Some argue that humanitarian aid may provide positive externalities hence mitigating the negative impact of refugees. For example, Van Damme et al. (1998) find that with the inflow of refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990, the rates of major obstetric interventions for the Guinean population increased due to the presence of refugee-assistance programs. The authors' finding suggests that refugee-assistance programs are a positive externality of refugee influx that can improve the health system and health infrastructure of refugee-receiving states.

Reduction in public health levels in refugee-receiving states can lead states to initiate conflict because of the burden negative public health consequences place on refugee-receiving states. Poor health undermines the stability of states in several manners. First, poor health affects human capital, decreases economic development, and impedes a nation's productivity (Fortson 2011). Second, contagion induces disintegration of social capital and cohesion (Price-Smith 2009). Third, negative public health consequences can lead to societal unrest, making it necessary for states to take action to stabilize the nation. These ramifications pose a threat to national security, pushing states to react aggressively towards refugee-sending states by initiating conflict.

When a state lacks the capabilities to cope with these public health consequences and burdens, the state is more likely to engage in international bargaining to control refugee flows. However, as Salehyan (2008) argues, many states facing a large influx of refugees are weak states without sufficient international bargaining power. As a result, many states resort to initiating conflict as a means to alleviate the burden of refugees.

> **Hypothesis 1:** Refugees lead to a higher likelihood of international conflict initiation when the refugee-receiving state also has low public health levels.

4 Refugees and Ethnic Balance

This paper employs the intergroup relations literature from social psychology (e.g. Sherif 1966, Tajfel 1970) to analyze the relationship between refugees, ethnicity, and conflict. This approach allows us to explore the securitization of refugees further through the perception of ethnicity. While this approach differs from the abundant studies on ethnic conflicts, the social psychological approach contributes to our understanding of the role of ethnicity in conflicts by highlighting how societies activate their concern for ethnic balance

The ethnic-conflict literature is rather voluminous and has centered on ethnic motivations of conflict. For example, Laitin and Fearon (2003) suggest that ethnic motivations for civil conflict onset are overstated and that religious and ethnic diverse states are no more likely to suffer civil wars. Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that ethnic and religious fractionalization makes a society safer, rather than more dangerous. Other studies, however, find that ethnic diversity and fractionalization increase the probability of conflict. For example, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) find that ethnic conflict with governments is more likely when the representatives of ethnic groups are excluded from state power, especially if they

experienced a recent loss of power, the greater the ethnic groups' mobilization capacity is, and if they have experienced conflict in the past. Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) also find that horizontal inequalities between politically relevant ethnic groups and states at large can promote ethnic conflict.

While much research has looked at the relationship between ethnicity and conflict, less work investigates refugees, ethnicity and conflict. Past research on the relationship between refugees, ethnicity, and conflict has suggested refugees can upset the "ethnic balance" of the refugee-receiving state. For example, Newland (1993) suggests that refugees can significantly alter the ethnic composition of the refugee-receiving state. However, generally the number of refugees in a host state is not large enough to significantly modify the ethnic composition of a state. Alternatively, we suggest that refugees can upset the preexisting conception of ethnic balance in refugee-receiving states. Refugees can be seen and labeled as "foreigners" and "unwanted" by the citizens and the government of the refugee-receiving state. Additionally, refugees may pose a cultural threat because their presence can activate ethnic awareness, leading certain groups in the state to react negatively to refugees.

One useful approach to understanding the intersection of refugees, ethnicity, and conflict is the intergroup relations literature from social psychology; this approach is particularly important in explaining how host states securitize refugees. The use of social psychological theories in the study of ethnicity and conflict is certainly not new. For example, Horowitz (1985) uses group psychology to explain the source for ethnic conflict. Horowitz argues that much of the tension between ethnic groups comes from group comparison. Some groups will always have to catch up to others since colonial policies strengthen group identities by creating "advanced" and "backward" groups. We suggest that the application of social psychology in the study of the intersection of refugees, ethnicity, and conflict provides useful insights to the topic.

Intergroup relations are the interaction between individuals or groups of individuals who belong to distinct groups. The process is especially prevalent when the interaction is in terms of group identification (Sherif 1966). Two important concepts from Sherif's deserve further attention: group and group identification. Groups are defined in terms of external or internal criteria. External criteria are outside designations, such as hospital patients, members of a trade union, etc. Internal criteria are those of "group identification," which merely refers to the acknowledgement that the group exists (Tajfel 1970). In order to recognize from within the

group that the group exists and achieve group identification two necessary factors must be present. First, a cognitive component, in terms of a sense of awareness of membership, must be present. Second, an evaluative component, in the sense that group membership awareness is related to some value associations, must also be present. Thus, these are the *necessary* conditions for groups and group identification. However, Tajfel (1982) argues that there are no *sufficient* conditions. Overall, conceptions of groups and group identification serve as the basis for theories of intergroup behavior and relations, including ethnic groups. One of the key insights of intergroup relations theories is that they attempt to predict when intergroup bias, discrimination, and/or favoritism occurs. Conflict, as understood in the international relations literature, is one of the most or the most extreme forms of intergroup bias, discrimination, and/or favoritism. Thus, for intergroup conflict to occur, there must be extreme forms of intergroup bias, discrimination, and/or favoritism. In a sense then, intergroup conflict is a "hard case" for intergroup relations theories to predict. One theory that is useful in explaining the relationship between refugees and conflict, in terms of intergroup behavior and intergroup relations, is social identity theory.

Social identity theory (SIT) claims people tend to classify themselves into various social categories, such as organizational membership, religious affiliation, gender, and age group (Turner 1975). Compared to the idea of the self as unitary and sovereign, SIT views the self as more complex. In addition to personal identity, individuals also have a social identity (i.e. membership in various groups). It is from the group membership that individuals get a sense of social identity (Reicher 2004). For SIT then, intergroup relations start with the activation of social identification.

In the case of refugees, two identities could be activated: the citizenship and nationality of the refugee-receiving state, as well as the ethnic groups present in the refugee-receiving state. The presence of refugees in the refugee-receiving state is likely to activate the social identity of individuals in one of two ways: as citizens of the host state or as members of an ethnic group in the refugee-receiving state. Once a social identity is activated, groups seek intergroup evaluation. This evaluative process, along with other intergroup behavior, is self-esteem motivated. Social identity gives individuals additional self-esteem beyond the self-esteem from their personal identity (Tajfel 1970). As such, during intergroup evaluations, the goal is to build self-esteem of the in-group at the expense of the out-group. In order to build the self-esteem of the in-group, the status of that group is increased while the status of the out-group is diminished. The in-group

biases and discrimination against the out-group, while favoring the in-group, originates from this self-esteem and status enhancing behavior. As discussed above, if this bias and discrimination is extreme enough, actual violent conflict between the in- and out-group may occur.

Another factor that affects the likelihood of bias, discrimination, and conflict is the importance of the group or group salience. As in-group identity becomes more salient the likelihood of bias, discrimination and conflict also increases. This group salience proposition is the case because as the group salience increases so the amount of self-esteem derived from that group (Tajfel 1970). Thus, as the more self-esteem derived from the group increases, so does the importance of that group and related self-esteem.

Bearing in mind that group size is one aspect of group salience, as the relative group size increases so does the likelihood of bias, discrimination and conflict. There are two reasons why greater group size leads to individuals placing more importance on the group and gaining more benefits from the group. First, group size can affect the status of the group. Large groups can have a higher status than smaller groups because larger groups can use greater resources to accomplish and achieve more than smaller groups, and accomplishments and achievements are a key factor in status (Maoz 2011). Second, the positive self-esteem gained from group membership increases as the status of the group increases (Abrams and Hogg 1988). Thus, individuals in high-status groups will gain high amounts of self-esteem while individuals in low-status groups will receive little self-esteem as a result of group membership. Consider ethnic groups: given the presence of refugees, as the ethnic homogeneity of the refugee-receiving state increases, so does the likelihood of conflict between the refugee-sending and refugee-hosting state.

> **Hypothesis 2:** Refugees lead to a higher likelihood of international conflict initiation when the refugee-receiving state is also ethnically homogenous.

5 Refugees and Civil Conflicts

Another possible condition in which refugees may lead to international conflict is civil conflict. This condition primarily operates by refugees interacting with ongoing civil conflict to induce international conflict.[11] According to previous research, there are several reasons why

[11] The civil conflict mechanism may also work in an additional manner, namely that the refugees in the receiving state may lead to civil conflict, which then can lead to international conflict initiation. However, we do not test this

refugees may exacerbate civil conflict in the host state. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) suggest refugees can expand rebel social networks and cause negative externalities. Refugees are often victims of political opposition and violence in their home state. Thus, rebel social networks can bring in either actual rebel fighters who engage in civil conflict, or political dissidents who also foment conflict. Similarly, militant or insurgent leaders may manipulate refugees for strategic purposes (Lischer 2008). First, militant leaders may forcibly remove refugees to gain territory or other resources. Second, militants can exaggerate or distort the nature of the threat that caused the refugees to flee in the first place. Without alternative sources of information, refugees may join the militants because they see it as there only option for protection.

Refugees can also provide support for domestic opposition groups, most likely to those of the same ethnic groups or political factions. Diasporas often set up institutions that connect refugees and dissidents both in and out of the host state. These groups may make political demands of the host governments; while host governments may make it known that the refugee and diaspora groups are unwelcome. Such disagreement may result in conflict (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Even the reaction of state and rebel forces to refugees within a receiving state can worsen civil conflict. Johnson (2011) suggests that refugee camps are vulnerable to attack, particularly when the demographics of the camp are favorable for the attackers. For example, refugee camps with more females and a younger population are more vulnerable to attack. Thus if attacks are frequent and brutal enough, the refugees may respond with violence. This attack and counter-attack pattern could lead to a full-fledged civil conflict.

Civil conflicts, in particular those that pertain to refugee involvement, may lead to international conflict in several ways. First, civil conflicts can create opportunities and diversions that lower the expected costs or increase the expected benefits of international conflict (Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008). Civil conflicts can create opportunities for other states to attack the state with civil conflict due to weakened defenses and an increased opportunity for capturing resources. Civil conflict can also encourage diversionary behavior for leaders who want to blame foreigners for their problems or create a 'rally around the flag' effect (Davies 2002). Overall, there are several reasons to expect that the presence of a civil conflict is preexisting condition that allows for the securitization of refugees, thus providing an opportunity for the refugee-receiving state to take military action.

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mechanism, as we are primarily interested in the interaction of refugees and civil conflict.

Hypothesis 3: Refugees lead to a higher likelihood of international conflict initiation when the refugee-receiving state also experiences civil conflict.

6 Refugees and Economic Burden

Finally, refugees can generate both negative externalities and positive externalities for the economy of refugee-receiving states. We suggest the presence of both positive and negative economic externalities may obstruct the securitization of refugees, at least at a national level. This is because the cost and benefit of refugee influxes are obfuscated; thus the host governments and their citizens do not have a clear preference toward refugees.

Refugees can increase economic burden in three ways. First, as Salehyan (2008) indicates, refugee-receiving states often bear the financial burden of maintaining the refugees by providing them with resources. The burden is especially troublesome for lower income states that already face economic hardships. Second, refugees can provide stocks of cheap labor, increasing competition on the labor market and fueling unemployment among the host states' population. The competition of employment also spills over to the housing market. One example is examined in Alix-Garcia et al (2013); the authors find that the refugees may be able to sign long-term rental contracts thus driving up the housing price. Third, refugees can be carriers of diseases, which can reduce economic productivity in a nation by damaging the pool of human capital. For example, Baez (2011) finds that refugee-receiving regions in Tanzania experience worsening anthropometrics, an increased incidence of infectious diseases, and an increased mortality rate. Diseases and malnutrition can disable individuals from the host states and hinder their abilities to work.

Concomitantly, refugees can generate several positive externalities for the economy of refugee-receiving states. Alix-Garcia and Saah (2009) examine the effects of the refugee crisis, caused by Rwandan and Burundian genocides, on the economic condition of the population in western Tanzania. The authors find that the presence of refugees increased the prices of agricultural goods, which benefit and increase the wealth of rural producers. However, the increase in price reduces the wealth of consumers in urban areas. Investigating the same situation, Maystadt and Verwimp (2009) demonstrate that refugee-receiving states can experience net economic gains when there is a sufficient mass of refugees, increasing the price of goods. Nevertheless, there is a clear heterogeneous impact on the refugee-receiving states.

Maystadt and Verwimp (2009) also find that agricultural workers are more likely to suffer economically due to an increase in competition for jobs. Simultaneously, through taking advantage of cheaper labors supplied by refugees, non-agricultural worker and self-employed farmers actually benefit from the refugees.

Moreover, Alix-Garcia and Barlett (2012) suggest that the humanitarian sector, which is often introduced due to the presence of refugees, may stimulate the economy. The authors argue that the humanitarian sector can serve as a source of employment as well as a generator of demand for goods. As a result, the needs of the humanitarian sector are likely to benefit the native workers, particularly those with the skills to provide the new sector.

Congruent with Ruiz and Vargas-Silva's (2013) review of economic literature on the impact of forced migration, we conclude that the impact of refugee influx on refugee-receiving states' is mixed. However, the current literature does identify clear winners and losers (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013). The agricultural producers who can take advantage of the cheap labor supplied by the refugees and the increased in demand of products are likely to enjoy the positive externalities of refugee influx. Children and local workers are likely to bear the negative externalities of refugee influxes. These individuals are likely to suffer health consequences and displacement from the local labor market.

It is possible that refugees combined with existing economic burden may lead to a higher likelihood for conflicts as host states want to remove the economic burden by forcing the refugee-sending states to allow the refugees to return to their state or origin. Similarly, when refugees exacerbate economic hardship can lead to a higher likelihood for conflicts. However, given the varying impact of refugees on host states' economy, the net economic impact is extremely convoluted. The refugee-receiving state population can gain from humanitarian sector and higher prices for goods; on the other hand, the receiving state population can lose through lowering wages, unemployment, and/or reduction in productivity. We suggest that the net economic impact of refugee influxes is not significant enough to exert an impact on a state's decision to initiate a conflict against refugee-sending state.

> **Hypotheses 4:** Refugees lead to a higher likelihood of international conflict initiation when the refugee-receiving state is also experiencing poor economic conditions.

7. Research Design

To explore the relationship between migration and interstate conflict, we investigate the conditional effect of state characteristics and refugees on the likelihood of refugee-receiving states to initiate conflict. Our analysis spans from the year 1980 to 2000 and includes all politically relevant dyads from this period. In order to examine if existing state conditions, not caused by refugees, are associated with higher propensity for conflict initiation, we include interaction terms in our model estimations. The inclusion of interaction terms allow us to capture the conditional effects of our independent variables of interest (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005), i.e. the public health, ethnicity, civil conflict, and economic variables.

7.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of this study is the *initiation of militarized interstate disputes (MID)*, the summary of which and all other variables used are in Table 1, The *MID* data comes from the dyadic version of the *MID* data set constructed by Maoz (2005), and are sets of interactions among states that involve the threat of use of military force, the display of military force, the actual use of military force, and must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned (Gochman and Maoz 1984). *MID* is coded as one in cases where there is MID initiation and zero otherwise.[12] More specifically, *MID* is coded one when the refugee-receiving state initiates a MID against the refugee sending state. We use binary probit models, and following convention, we only include political relevant dyads where the states share a border or include at least one major power because many dyads are unlikely to engage in conflict with each other. All analyses below use directed dyads, where the dyads from State A-State B and State B-State A are considered separately. We lag our independent variables for one year in order to minimize potential biases that stem from reverse causation. Finally, we also employ robust standard errors clustered on the dyad, as the dyadic observations may not be independent of each other.

7.2 Independent Variables

[12] We also divided MID by hostility level, i.e. threat to use force, display of force, use of war, and war. There are 30 instances of threat of force, 224 of display of force, 196 of use of force, and 13 of war. Results are unchanged when threat of force is excluded and when display and use of force are used individually. However, there are too few instances of threat of force and war to make any valid statistical claims. As a result, we pool all hostility levels together and use MID initiation.

The main independent variables in this study are (1) refugees, (2) public health levels, (3) ethnic homogeneity, (4) civil conflict, and (5) economic conditions. We also focus on the interaction between refugees and the other main independent variables. We use the same refugee data as Salehyan (2008), which is from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United National Relief and Works Agency, and the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. The *refugees* variable measures the number of refugees within the dyad. Specifically, refugees are reported the annual stock of refugees in a state.[13] Specifically, the *refugees* variable is the natural log of the refugee stock in the conflict initiator from the conflict target. The natural log of the refugee stock in conflict target from the conflict initiator is also included as a control.

There are numerous indicators of public health levels. Dietrich (2011) employs third dose of *diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine (DTP3) rates*. Other scholars, such as Price-Smith (2009), use infant mortality while trying to capture the burden of diseases. Ideally, one should employ a comprehensive indicator of public health to evaluate the impact of health aid on health levels. Two of such indicators are the DALE and HALE indicators constructed by the World Health Organization (Lopez et al. 2006; Murray and Lopez 1997). Nevertheless, the indicator is currently restricted to a limited number of years. Therefore, in order to examine the effects of health aid comprehensively, we employ the indicators previously employed plus an additional indicator on vaccination and indicators of disease burden. They are not perfect measures; however, combined with indicators other authors employ, we hope to present a more complete picture of the influence of health aid on public health levels in states.

The indicators for the level of public health included in this study are: (1) *DTP3*, (2) *measles vaccine (MCV)*, and (3) *HIV/AIDS prevalence rate*. The indicators for *DTP3, MCV*, and *HIV/AIDS prevalence rate* are from the World Health Organization. The *DTP3* variable indicates the percentage of one-year-olds out of the total population who are immunized with the third dose of *DTP3*. Similarly, the *MCV* variable indicates the percentage of one year olds out of the total population who are immunized with a dose of *MCV*. The *HIV/AIDS prevalence rate* consists of yearly cases of HIV/AIDS infection per population; that is, the indicator measures the percentage of the population infected with HIV/AIDS per year. The disease is considered one of

[13] We also created a refugee flow measure by taking the difference in refugee stocks in time *t* and time *t-1*, We do not include the results from the models estimated using refuge flows since this measure may not be the true value of annual refugee flows and the results are largely unchanged.

the most influential existing diseases (Low 1990; Murray and Lopez 1997; World Health Organization 2000), and is known to either handicap individuals, cause chronic suffering, and/or to be potentially fatal. We recognize that the relationship between refugees, infectious diseases, and conflicts, if present, may be skewed toward severe diseases.

To operationalize ethnic homogeneity we use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). For the creation of the dataset, ethnicity is defined as a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture. The EPR dataset's definition includes ethnolinguistic, ethnosomatic (or racial), and ethnoreligious groups, but not tribes and clans that conceive of ancestry in genealogical terms, or regions that do not define commonality based on shared ancestry. To operationalize the ethnic homogeneity of a state, which is the main explanatory variable from Hypothesis 3, we use the variable *homogeneity*, which measures the population of the largest ethnic group as a proportion of the total population of a state. If a particular ethnic group makes up a significant proportion of the total population, other ethnic groups' proportion of the total population decrease, which increases the overall ethnic homogeneity of a state. Thus, as the largest group's share of the total population increases so does the ethnic homogeneity of a state.

We employ a standard indicator for civil conflict, a binary variable with 1 indicating the occurrence of civil conflict. The data is from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and include major and minor civil conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Lastly, we use three indicators for economic burden: (1) *unemployment rate,* (2) *inflation rate* and (3) the different in GDP per capita in time *t* from *t-1*, which we call *economic shock*. These indicators are from the World Bank.

7.3 Control Variables

For comparison purposes we include the same control variables as Salehyan (2008).[14][15] These include internal conflict in the sending or receiving state (Gleditsch et al. 2002), regime

[14] Following Salehyan, we do not include GDP as a control variable our final models. The exclusion is due to the fact that GDP does not have a statistically significant relationship with our variables of interest and our goal to avoid a "garbage can" model. However, robustness checks which include GDP as a control variable, do not produce results that are significantly different from our models excluding GDP.

[15] The purpose of our paper is to show that these societal factors, outside of the general state capacity, influence the propensity for conflicts. We ran analyses including our variables of interest as well as state capacity, which is measured as bureaucratic quality (See Hendrix (2010) for a discussion of bureaucratic quality measures). We find the state capacity variable to be insignificant and the substative results of the models do not change. Thus, with the

type (Jaggers and Marshall 2002), geographic continuity (Stinnett et al. 2002), colonial contiguity (Correlates of War 2 Project) material capability ratio (Gibler and Sarkees 2004), alliance portfolio similarity (Signorino and Ritter 1999), trade dependence (Gleditsch 2002), shared IGO membership (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004), and the number of logged years since the last MID. We also include a cubic spline with three knots to account for possible duration dependence (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).[16]

8. Results

8.1 Public Health

Our main interest in the model specifications is the interaction terms between the specific receiving-state conditions and refugees. However, we must first compare the interactive models to baseline models that do not contain interaction terms. When we compare the baseline public health models, 1a and 2a in Table 2, to the interactive models, 1b and 2b, we see that *DTP3* and *MCV* do not have an independent effect on conflict. Only when these public health characteristics are interacted with conflict do they affect conflict initiation. This provides support for our hypothesis. We also see that the *refugees* coefficient is negative and significant when interaction included in models 1b and 2b. This indicates that refugees have a negative effect on conflict onset. While this result seems puzzling, there are two explanations to the finding. First, the constituent coefficient of *refugees* is calculated when *DTP3* and *MCV* are equal to zero; however, there is only one instance of *DTP3* equal to zero and two instances of *MCV* equaling zero. *DTP3* equals zero in Lebanon in 1980 and *MCV* equals zero in Lebanon in 1980 and 1981. As a result, the actual scenario where refugees and propensity for conflict is almost non-existent. In addition, even though DPT3 and MCV rarely are equal to zero, if we were to think about the state capacity of a state that is unable to vaccinate anyone, it would indicate a complete lack of

goal of avoiding a "garbage can" model, we only present the models without the state capacity variable.

[16] In addition to the control variables Salehyan (2008) employs, we also consider the effect of foreign aid in our model. The reason is that while refugees are associated with negative externalities they can also bring in positive externalities in forms of international assistance. Foreign aid can mitigate the negative externalities of refugee flows by providing refugees with health care and housing. In some cases, foreign aid is associated with refugees may also stimulate the economy of refugee-receiving states . The foreign aid data is from the World Development Indicators from the World Bank dataset and the foreign aid variable is the net official development assistance received as a percent of the state gross national income. In all models, the foreign aid variable is insignificant and does not change any substantive effects of the other variables. As such, we do not report the results that include the foreign aid variable.

state capacity. In this case, a state will be unable to initiate conflict whether or not there are refugees present.

In interpreting the interactive models, our main interest, the interaction terms tell an interesting story regarding the role public health levels play in the relationship between *refugees* and *MID*. First, looking at Model 1b in Table 2, one can see that the coefficient for the correlation between *refugees* and *MID* is negative and significant, though only at the .1 level. In other words, after accounting for *DTP3* vaccination rate, refugee stocks are weakly and negatively associated with the propensity for conflict initiation. On the other hand, both the constituent *DTP3* term and the interaction between *refugees* and *DTP3* have a statistical significant relationship with *MID*. To aid interpretation, we plot the marginal effects of the DTP3-refugee interaction on *MID*. Figure 1 shows the average marginal effects of the DTP3 vaccination rate across the range of refugee stocks. There two important points that are gleaned from the plot. First, the effect of *DTP3* is significant across the entire range of refugees with the 95 percent confidence interval never crossing the horizontal zero line. Second, while the effect of the DTP3 vaccination rate is always negative, the effect diminishes as the number of refugees increase. In other words, high levels of public health in a state, measure by the rate of the DTP3 vaccination, reduces the probability of that state initiating conflict. However, the reduction in MID initiation shrinks as the number of refugees increase.

Model 2b in Table 2 presents the results for the interaction of *MCV* and *refugees*, which are similar to the results for the interaction of *DTP3* and *refugees*. By taking into account the MCV vaccination rate, refugee stocks have a negative and significant relationship with *MID*. The interaction between refugee stocks and the MCV vaccination rate as well as the constituent MCV vaccination rate term also have a statistical significant relationship with MID initiation. The average marginal effects are plotted Figure 2 and show a similar pattern as *DTP3*. The effect of the MCV vaccination rate is significant across the range of the refugee variable with the 95 percent confidence interval only nearing the horizontal zero line toward the maximum value of refugees. As with DTP3, as the number of refugees increases, the moderating effect of MCV on MID initiation decreases.

The results show that both DTP3 and MCV vaccination rates are associated with a reduced propensity for conflict initiation. This finding supports Hypothesis 1. States with better preventive health care and lower health burdens are less likely to initiate conflicts when refugees

are present. The finding suggests that if a refugee-receiving state has the capacity to provide basic preventive care, then refugee stocks are less likely to be an externality that leads refugee-receiving states to react negatively towards refugee-sending states. Conversely, the combination of refugees and a low preventive care leads to a higher likelihood of conflict initiation.[17]

Looking at Table 3. *HIV/AIDS prevalence rate* are insignificant in our probit models with interaction terms. The combination of a high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate and refugees does not have a statistically significant relationship with the propensity for MID initiation. The results demonstrate that existing public health issues, such as infectious disease epidemics that are not caused by the refugees, are not associated with increased likelihood of conflict initiation. Governments that face high rates of HIV/AIDS do not react to refugees by initiating conflict. This finding also suggests that refugee-receiving states either do not use refugees as a scapegoat to avoid political blame for health crises or are unable to securitize refugees via the prevalence of HIV/AIDS.

8.2 Ethnic Balance

When we compare the baseline ethnic model, 4a and Table 4, to the interactive model, 4b, we see that *homogeneity* is not significant in the baseline model and the *homogeneity-refugees* interaction is significant in the interactive model. Also the *refugees* coefficient is significant in the baseline model, but the *refugees* constituent term in not significant in the interactive model. This result indicates that *homogeneity* does not have an independent effect on conflict and that *homogeneity* conditions the effect of refugees on conflict initiation.

The results for the interactive model provide more support for our argument. All control variables perform as expected. The constituent terms of the refugee stock and ethnic homogeneity are insignificant. Since interpretation of the individual constituent variables when an interaction is included in the model is not meaningful, we look at the interaction term to better interpret the model. The interaction term is positive and significant. Again, we plot the marginal effects to help interpretation of the interaction term in Figure 3. The average marginal effect of

[17] We also examine if refugees worsens public health conditions that then increase the probability of conflicts. The results are included in the appendices. In essence, we find that the *refugees* variable is associated with an increased *HIV/AIDS prevalence rate*. However, the increased *HIV/AIDS prevalence rate* has an insignificant relationship with the probability of MID initiation. This suggests while refugees are stressors that exacerbate existing burden and push refugee-receiving states to initiate conflict, refugees by themselves are not enough to generate sufficient externalities to justify conflict initiation.

ethnic homogeneity on MID initiation is positive and increasing as the number of refugees in a receiving state increases. However, the effect of ethnic homogeneity is not always significant. The confidence interval crosses the horizontal zero line when there are no refugees and at the highest values of the refugee variable. The effect is significant starting approximately between the logged value of four and five (roughly between 55 and 150 refugees in the initiator) and ending approximately at 15 (approximately 3,260,000 refugees in the initiator). However, there is only one non-zero observation in the data that fits this description. In 1989, there were over 3,272,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In other words, the effect of ethnic homogeneity is significant at almost all values of the refugee variable. The substantive impact of ethnic homogeneity is quite significant. The average effect of ethnic homogeneity increases from approximately .01 to approximately .03, a 200% increase when including only where the marginal effect is statistical significant. Overall, these results support Hypothesis 3 and our argument that refugees can increase the likelihood a state will initiate conflict when the state is ethnically homogenous. This finding also highlights the importance of ethnic composition in the securitization of refugees.

8.3 Civil Conflict

As with the previous analyses, to test the civil conflict hypotheses we use binary probit models with interaction terms between the refugee and civil conflict variables, which are reported in Model 5b in Table 5. First, we compare the baseline model, 5a, with the interactive model. In baseline and interactive models the civil conflict and refugees coefficients are positive and significant, meaning that both civil conflict and refugees have an independent and positive effect on conflict initiation. The interaction of civil conflict and refugees is also significant, but the coefficient is negative. Additional graphical interpretation of the interaction is needed to judge any substantive effects.

Overall in the interactive civil conflict model, 5b, all control variables perform as expected. Both the civil conflict and logged refugee variables are positive and significant. In Figure 4, the average marginal effects of civil conflict on MID initiation are plotted across the range of refugees. The overall effect of civil conflicts starts as positive at low levels of refugees then decreases until the effect is negative at higher levels of refugee stocks. However, the marginal effect of civil conflict is only significant at low levels of refugees as the 95 percent

confidence interval crosses the horizontal zero line below the logged mean value of the refugee variable, which is approximately eight. In fact the confidence interval crosses the horizontal zero line at approximately log six, or roughly 400 refugees. There are no non-zero observations in the data with that few refugees. Thus, the interaction of refugees and pre-existing civil conflict is only significant when there are no refugees. One explanation for this result is that possible refugee-receiving states that are experiencing civil conflict are expending most of their resources on the civil conflict. As a result, states that are embroiled in civil conflict are simply less able to initiate conflict against refugee-sending states.

8.4 Economic Conditions

Finally, Table 6 provides the results for the relationship between refugees, economic burden, and interstate conflict. The baseline models without the interactions are 6a (unemployment), 7a (inflation), and 8a (economic shock). Models 6b, 7b, and 8b include the interactions. Comparing the baseline and interactive models we see that none of the interactions are significant and only the only economic variable that is significant is economic shock. Also, none of main variables of interest differ from the baseline models to the interactive models.

When we look at the interactive models we find that the poor economic conditions that are present before the arrival of refugees do not lead to a higher likelihood for interstate conflict. Furthermore, refugees are not associated with a higher economic burden in terms of unemployment rate, inflation rate, and any economic shock in refugee-receiving states. We reason that the lack of a clear relationship may be due to the convoluted effects of refugees on refugee-receiving states' economy. For example, refugees tend to cluster in different regions. Thus, the influence of refugees on the economy may be regional rather than national. The regional effect of refugees on the refugee-receiving states' economic condition has both theoretical and statistical implications. Theoretically, the burden of refugees in selected regions of states may not be a sufficient national issue for states to justify employing international conflicts as a political strategy. As a result, we do not observe a relationship between refugees, economic conditions, and MID. Statistically, the regional effect of refugees may require a micro-level analysis rather than the macro-level analyses this paper employ. The micro-level analyses, which require a micro-theory, a different dataset, and dependent variables, are out of the scope of this paper and are left for future studies.

9. Discussion

Our findings explain why the Great Lakes refugee crisis only led to an interstate conflict between Zaire and Rwanda, but not in other states. The refugee flows did not lead to significant negative externalities in Tanzania, because it is ethnically heterogeneous (with 120 ethnic groups) and as a result was not susceptible to the activation of ethnic awareness. Furthermore, Tanzania had better public health conditions and capacity from past refugee crises to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. Since Burundi was already facing a civil war prior to the arrival of the refugees, Burundi cannot blame Rwanda for the ongoing civil conflict, despite the fact that refugees may have exacerbated the intensity of the existing civil war. On the other hand, Zaire faced significant socio-economic burdens. While Zaire was ethnically diverse, the Bantu people represent 65% of the population, making Zaire a state with high ethnic homogeneity. Furthermore, Zaire faced poor public health conditions prior to the influx of refugees. These state characteristics, namely the preexisting public health conditions and ethnic balance, may explain why with the additional burden of refugees led Zaire and other refugee-receiving states with similar characteristics resort to conflicts.

In this study, we explore the conditions that influence the relationship between refugees and interstate conflict. Using probit models with interaction terms we find that different socio-economic factors affect the likelihood that refugees are associated with interstate conflict. The results suggest that when refugees are combined with low levels of preventive health care in refugee-receiving states, it leads to a higher likelihood for conflict initiation by the refugee-receiving state. We also find that when the refugee-receiving state has high levels of ethnic homogeneity, ethnic and national awareness is activated and conflict initiation is more likely. The stress states face with the lack of adequate resources to cope with refugees and ethnic balance thus contribute to the securitization of refugees and eventual militarized interstate disputes associated with refugee influxes.

Additionally, when we include the interaction terms and take the state level stressors into account, the control variables in our models behave more in-line with past research as compared to Salehyan's (2008) results. For example, in our public health, economic burden, ethnic relations, and civil conflict models, the indicator that the dyad is democratic is negative and strongly significant. This result aligns with the research on Democratic Peace Theory (e.g. Maoz

and Russett (1993)), unlike Salehyan's (2008) results, which indicate that democratic dyads are more likely to engage in conflict. This finding provides further support that state characteristics, namely pre-exiting domestic burden, are important factors in explaining the probability of conflicts in the presence of refugees. Without considering these burdens, Salehyan finds that democracies have a higher likelihood of fighting each other in the presence of refugees. However, once we take into account domestic burdens, we show that democracies have a lower likelihood of engaging in conflicts with each other.

Understanding the specific conditions that connect the relationship between refugee influxes and conflicts has important policy implications. Refugees often carry the blame for increasing propensity for conflicts; however, refugees are actually just part of the story. The securitization of refugees requires not only the refugees but also specific domestic conditions that allow the states to generate the perfect storm and initial conflicts. It is more important for governments to eliminate socio-economic stressors than to prevent the influx of refugees. By removing or abating the economic stressors states can prevent refugee influxes from worsening socio-economic conditions to a point where conflict initiation becomes a more viable option.

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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics						
	Years	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**SD**	**Min**	**Max**
MID	1980-2000	59,343	.01	.10	0	1
Refugees	1980-2000	60,512	4,192	67,096	0	3,272,290
DTP3 Vaccination Rate	1980-2000	55,140	.76	.23	0	.99
MCV Vaccination Rate	1980-2000	53.793	.74	.23	0	.99
HIV/AIDS Prevalence	1990-2000	29,464	.56	1.52	0	14.79
Ethnic Homogeneity	1980-2000	53,081	.58	.31	0	.99
Civil Conflict	1980-2000	60,512	.11	.32	0	1
Economic Shock	1980-2000	54,398	-7.58	122	-7084	8,496
GDP (per capita)	1980-2000	54,460	9,584	11,376	62	82700
Unemployment	1980-2000	33,716	.08	.05	0	.44
Inflation	1980-2000	48,531	.48	5.2	-1	238
Democracy	1980-2000	55,325	.51	.50	0	1
Democracy-Democracy	1980-2000	60,512	.22	.42	0	1
Transitional Democracy	1980-2000	55,325	.02	.15	0	1
Contiguity	1980-2000	60,512	.34	.47	0	1
Colonial Contiguity	1980-2000	60,512	.05	.22	0	1
Capacity Share	1980-2000	60,512	.50	.42	0	1
Alliance Similarity	1980-2000	60,512	3.4	1.2	1	4
Trade Dependency	1980-2000	58,513	.02	.15	0	16.9
Shared IGO Membership	1980-2000	60,512	28.9	15.1	0	100
Peace Years	1980-2000	60,512	27.8	26.8	0	184

TABLE 2: Public Health Probit Results				
	Model 1a	**Model 1b**	**Model 2a**	**Model 2b**
Refugees (initiator) * DTP3		.001*** (.000)		
Refugees (initiator) * MCV				.001*** (.000)
Refugees (initiator)	.022*** (.006)	-.031* (.017)	.022*** (.006)	-.035** (.018)
DTP3	-.001 (.001)	-.003** (.001)		
MCV			-.001 (.001)	-.003*** (.001)
Homogeneity	.106 (.104)	.094 (.104)	.103 (.102)	.084 (.101)
Refugees (target)	.015** (.006)	.017*** (.006)	.017** (.006)	.020*** (.006)
Civil Conflict (initiator)	.304*** (.057)	.300*** (.061)	.289*** (.059)	.285*** (.059)
Civil Conflict (target)	.143** (.061)	.158*** (.061)	.151** (.063)	.166*** (.063)
Democracy (initiator)	.086 (.067)	.083 (.067)	.085 (.069)	.082 (.069)
Democracy (target)	.170** (.071)	.178** (.070)	.181** (.073)	.191*** (.073)
Democracy-Democracy	-.475*** (.105)	-.461*** (.105)	-.472*** (.108)	-.462*** (.109)
Transitional (initiator)	-.291** (.131)	-.248* (.129)	-.268** (.132)	-.222* (.130)
Transitional (target)	-.102 (.113)	-.090 (.112)	-.098 (.114)	-.092 (.113)
Contiguity	.502*** (.074)	.497*** (.074)	.491*** (.075)	.487*** (.075)
Colonial Contiguity	.327*** (.104)	.326*** (.106)	.348*** (.102)	.344*** (.105)
Capacity Share	.385*** (.069)	.402*** (.069)	.398*** (.068)	.417*** (.069)
Alliance Similarity	-.023 (.023)	-.019 (.023)	-.0278 (.023)	-.024 (.024)
Dependency (initiator)	-.067 (.749)	-.009 (.709)	-.076 (.774)	-.012 (.739)
Dependency (target)	-.443 (.437)	-.454 (.443)	-.413 (.432)	-.444 (.441)
IGOs	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)
Peace Years	-.205*** (.017)	-.202*** (.017)	-.206*** (.017)	-.202*** (.018)
Spline 1	-.001*** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)
Spline 2	.000*** (.000)	.000*** (.000)	.000*** (.000)	.000*** (.000)
Spline 3	-.000** (.000)	-.000** (.000)	-.000** (.000)	-.000** (.000)
Constant	-1.802*** (.189)	-1.751*** (.188)	-1.797*** (.194)	-1.740*** (.194)
N	40,794	40,794	39,896	39,896
Pseudo R^2	.301	.304	.302	.305
* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01				

TABLE 3: AIDS Probit Results		
	Model 3a	**Model 3b**
Refugees (in initiator) * HIV/AIDS Prevalence		-.003 (.004)
Refugees (in initiator)	.034*** (.010)	.036*** (.010)
HIV/AIDS Prevalence	-.002 (.022)	-.008 (.028)
Refugees (in target)	.029*** (.009)	.029*** (.009)
Homogeneity	.239* (.124)	.238* (.124)
Civil Conflict (initiator)	.281*** (.081)	.282*** (.081)
Civil Conflict (target)	.353*** (.089)	.356*** (.090)
Democracy (initiator)	.078 (.104)	.074 (.103)
Democracy (target)	.032 (.105)	.030 (.104)
Democracy-Democracy	-.352** (.140)	-.345** (.139)
Transitional (initiator)	-.081 (.241)	-.083 (.240)
Transitional (target)	-.201 (.153)	-.192 (.152)
Contiguity	.536*** (.090)	.535*** (.090)
Colonial Contiguity	.260 (.171)	.261 (.171)
Capacity Share	.460*** (.115)	.459*** (.115)
Alliance Similarity	-.029 (.035)	-.029 (.035)
Dependency (initiator)	-.812 (1.237)	-.806 (1.236)
Dependency (target)	-.153 (.404)	-.151 (.401)
IGOs	.007** (.003)	.007** (.003)
Peace Years	-.189*** (.024)	-.189*** (.024)
Spline 1	-.001*** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)
Spline 2	.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)
Spline 3	-.000** (.000)	-.000** (.000)
Constant	-2.383*** (.246)	-2.388*** (.246)
N	22,400	22,400
Pseudo R^2	.298	.298
* $p \leq .1$, ** $p \leq .05$, *** $p \leq .01$		

TABLE 4: Ethnicity Probit Results		
	Model 4a	**Model 4b**
Refugees (initiator) * Homogeneity		.053** (.025)
Refugees (initiator)	.022*** (.006)	-.006 (.015)
Ethnic Homogeneity	.106 (.104)	.037 (.106)
Refugees (target)	.015** (.006)	.015** (.006)
DTP3	-.001 (.001)	-.002 (.001)
Civil Conflict (initiator)	.304*** (.057)	.305*** (.057)
Civil Conflict (target)	.143** (.061)	.149** (.062)
Democracy (initiator)	.086 (.066)	.074 (.067)
Democracy (target)	.170** (.071)	.163** (.070)
Democracy-Democracy	-.475*** (.104)	-.453*** (.105)
Transitional (initiator)	-.291** (.131)	-.273 (.132)
Transitional (target)	-.102 (.113)	-.098 (.113)
Contiguity	.502*** (.075)	.499*** (.074)
Colonial Contiguity	.327*** (.104)	.330*** (.105)
Capacity Share	.385*** (.069)	.392*** (.069)
Alliance Similarity	-.023 (.023)	-.016 (.024)
Dependency (initiator)	-.067 (.749)	-.034 (.722)
Dependency (target)	-.443 (.436)	-.457 (.440)
IGOs	.003 (.002)	.003 (.002)
Peace Years	-.205*** (.017)	-.204*** (.017)
Spline 1	-.001*** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)
Spline 2	.000*** (.000)	.000*** (.000)
Spline 3	-.000** (.000)	-.000** (.000)
Constant	-1.802*** (.188)	-1.786*** (.187)
N	40,794	40,794
Pseudo R^2	.301	.303
* $p \leq .1$, ** $p \leq .05$, *** $p \leq .01$		

TABLE 5: Civil Conflict Probit Results		
	Model 5a	**Model 5b**
Refugees (initiator) * Civil Conflict (initiator)		-.033** (.015)
Refugees (initiator)	.022*** (.006)	.031*** (.008)
Civil Conflict (initiator)	.304*** (.057)	.357*** (.061)
Refugees (target)	.015** (.006)	.016** (.006)
DTP3	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)
Ethnic Homogeneity	.106 (.104)	.097 (.105)
Civil Conflict (target)	.143** (.061)	.152** (.061)
Democracy (initiator)	087 (.066)	.090 (.067)
Democracy (target)	.170** (.071)	.168** (.072)
Democracy-Democracy	-.475*** (.105)	-.464*** (.106)
Transitional (initiator)	.291** (.131)	-.280** (.131)
Transitional (target)	-.102 (.113)	-.097 (.114)
Contiguity	.502*** (.074)	.500*** (.075)
Colonial Contiguity	.327*** (.104)	.330*** (.105)
Capacity Share	.385*** (.069)	.388*** (.069)
Alliance Similarity	.023 (.023)	-.019 (.024)
Dependency (initiator)	.067 (.749)	-.027 (.726)
Dependency (target)	-.443 (.436)	-.388 (.426)
IGOs	003 (.002)	.003 (.002)
Peace Years	-.205*** (.017)	-.204*** (.017)
Spline 1	-.001*** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)
Spline 2	.000*** (.000)	.000*** (.000)
Spline 3	-.000** (.000)	-.000** (.000)
Constant	-1.802*** (.189)	-1.840*** (.173)
N	40,794	40,794
Pseudo R^2	.301	.303
* $p \leq .1$, ** $p \leq .05$, *** $p \leq .01$		

TABLE 6: Economy Probit Results						
	Model 6a	**Model 6b**	**Model 7a**	**Model 7b**	**Model 8a**	**Model 8b**
Refugees (initiator) * Unemployment		-.001 (.002)				
Refugees (initiator) * Inflation				.000 (.000)		
Refugees (initiator) * Economic Shock						-.000 (.000)
Refugees (initiator)	.036*** (.010)	.046** (.018)	.020*** (.007)	.020*** (.008)	.025*** (.007)	.024*** (.007)
Unemployment	-.005 (.007)	-.002 (.007)				
Inflation			-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)		
Economic Shock					.000* (.000)	.000** (.000)
Refugees (target)	.036*** (.010)	.031*** (.012)	.015* (.008)	.015* (.008)		.018** (.008)
Ethnic Homogeneity	.194* (.112)	.195* (.113)	.153 (.096)	.152 (.096)	.239** (.094)	.239** (.094)
DTP3	-.003 (.002)	-.003 (.003)	-.002 (.001)	-.002 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)
Civil Conflict (initiator)	.298 (.090)	.296*** (.090)	.358*** (.061)	.359*** (.061)	.339*** (.057)	.339*** (.056)
Civil Conflict (target)	.251*** (.089)	.252*** (.089)	.189*** (.064)	.188*** (.065)	.171*** (.063)	.172*** (.063)
Democracy (initiator)	.191* (.102)	.187* (.102)	.117* (.071)	.116 (.072)	.100 (.067)	.100 (.067)
Democracy (target)	.264** (.108)	.266** (.108)	.160** (.079)	.160** (.079)	.146** (.073)	.146** (.073)
Democracy-Democracy	-.624*** (.141)	-.626*** (.141)	-.504*** (.109)	-.504*** (.110)	-.458*** (.105)	-.458*** (.105)
Transitional (initiator)	(omitted)	(omitted)	-.131 (.144)	-.131 (.145)	-.133 (.135)	-.133 (.135)
Transitional (target)	-.286 (.249)	-.287 (.250)	-.256* (.141)	-.258* (.142)	-.165 (.122)	-.164 (.122)
Contiguity	.478*** (.077)	.478*** (.077)	.472*** (.075)	.472*** (.076)	.507*** (.072)	.508*** (.072)
Colonial Contiguity	.337*** (.098)	.336*** (.098)	.359*** (.110)	.358*** (.111)	.342*** (.105)	.343*** (.105)
Capacity Share	.365*** (.105)	.363*** (.105)	.444*** (.084)	.444*** (.084)	.431 (.077)	.433*** (.077)
Alliance Similarity	-.041 (.031)	-.042 (.032)	-.025 (.024)	-.025 (.024)	-.022 (.024)	-.022 (.024)
Dependency (initiator)	.427 (.998)	.414 (1.005)	.330 (.814)	.330 (.814)	-.135 (.902)	-.131 (.901)
Dependency (target)	-.507 (.499)	-.489 (.495)	-.571 (.502)	-.571 (.502)	-.430 (.460)	-432 (.461)
IGOs	.004 (.003)	.004 (.003)	.005** (.002)	.005** (.002)	.005** (.002)	.005** (.002)
Peace Years	-.217*** (.020)	-.217*** (.021)	-.203*** (.019)	-.203*** (.019)	.194*** (.017)	-.194*** (.017)
Spline 1	-.001*** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)	-.001*** (.000)
Spline 2	.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	.000*** (.000)	.000*** (.000)
Spline 3	-.000* (.000)	-.000* (.000)	-.000* (.000)	-.000* (.000)	-.000*& (.000)	-.000* (.000)
Constant	-1.712*** (.291)	-1.730*** (.291)	-1.893*** (.184)	-1.892*** (.185)	-2.020*** (.171)	-2.020*** (.179)
N	25,610	25,610	35,879	35,879	38,692	38,692
R^2	.322	.322	.310	.310	.299	.300
* p ≤ .1, ** p ≤ .05, *** p ≤ .01						

Figure 1: Average Marginal Effects of DTP3



Figure 2: Average Marginal Effects of MCV



Figure 3: Average Marginal Effects of Ethnic Homogeneity



Figure 4: Average Marginal Effects of Civil Conflict